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PETITION FOR REHEARING

MEMORANDUM DECISION
A copy of the Memorandum Decision of the Court, filed June 24, 1999, is attached.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for breach of express and implied warranties, relying on the written documents stating the vehicle was sold "as is."
This ruling misapprehended that there was a factual issue concerning whether the entire
transaction, including the limitation of warranties, was induced by the seller's misrepresentation that the vehicle had been properly repaired. Because of the misrepresentations
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regarding the repairs, the exclusion of implied warranties was unreasonable and not enforceable.
Summary judgment on the claimed violations of the Motor Vehicle Act was also
improper. The facts establishing the violations were clear in the record and the issue was
raised in plaintiffs' initial memorandum. The detailed arguments submitted after oral arguments but before entry of the ruling should have been considered. Because summary
judgment may be entered only were there are no factual disputes in the record, summary
judgment was improper even though plaintiffs' memorandum did not initially focus on
that issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT ITHERE WAS A FACTUAL ISSUE CONCERNING
THEREASONABLENESS OF THE EXCLUSIONOF IMPLIED WARRANTIES.
Defendants did not dispute for purposes of summary judgment that Paul Clark, the
salesman, had represented to James Rawson that the vehicle had been properly repaired
following the accident. (Affidavit of James Rawson (R. 251-254) at 1f 4.) John Kirk, an
investigator with the Utah Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division, and who had prior experience with repair of damaged auto bodies and frames, testified by affidavit that the vehicle had not been properly repaired, and that it was unsafe to be operated. (Affidavit of
John F. Kirk (R. 243-246) atff6.) Andy Anderson, plaintiffs' expert who was in business
of performing similar repairs, testified the repair was "the worst one I've ever seen."
(Deposition of Andy Anderson (R. 328, 400) at p. 9.) Mr. Rawson testified that his purpose in purchasing the van was to acquire a "good, safe vehicle for providing dependable
transportation for ourselves and our family." (Affidavit of James K. Rawson (R. 251254) at ff3.) Finally, the car remained titled in the name of the dealership and was ultimately sold by the dealership; Clark's statements concerning the car must be deemed to
have been made on behalf of the dealership.

These facts in the record establish, for purposes of summary judgment, that Clark
and the dealership represented that the van was properly repaired and was safe to drive.
The facts were exactly opposite-the van had not been properly repaired and was unsafe to
drive. Judge Brian held this was insufficient to show fraudulent inducement to contract
because there was no proof that Clark or the dealership knew the vehicle was inadequately repaired or was unsafe to drive. Evidence was presented, as shown below, that
Clark and the dealership knew the vehicle was inadequately repaired because they limited
the scope of repairs. In addition, Judge Brian's ruling ignores the mandate that the Court
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993).
An owner of property is presumed to know the condition of the property. Dugan
v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, addressing proof of "intent to defraud" under the federal odometer fraud
statutes, held that a dealer has an affirmative duty to discover defects, and the "inference
of an intent to defraud is no less compelling when a person lacks actual knowledge of a
false odometer statement only by closing his eyes to the truth." Haynes v. Manning, 917
F.2d 450, 453 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The facts in this case, viewed in light of the owner/dealer's duty to discover the
truth, compel the inference that the defendants were aware that the vehicle had been improperly repaired. Plaintiffs' expert characterized the repairs as the worst he had ever
seen. Defendants did not present any contrary evidence, but claimed only that they believed the repairmen they had hired were competent. Because a fact finder may choose to
disregard such self-serving testimony, the Court on summary judgment should also disregard it. van der Heyde v. First Colony Life Insurance Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
In addition, the individual who performed the repairs, Jack Lambrose, testified in
his deposition that "he was told only to align the unibody rail. And the other repairs to
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the crush zones and collapse zones were to be completed by someone other than his
shop." (Quotation from transcript of oral arguments before Judge Iwasaki at pp. 23-24.
Defendants did not object to the recitation of the deposition testimony.) Defendants did
not hire anyone to repair the crush zones and collapse zones, but instead covered the defective areas up and passed it off to plaintiffs as adequately repaired. Id.
Based on this evidence, the court should have held that defendants had actively
concealed the inadequacy of the repairs while misrepresenting to plaintiffs that the repairs
had been properly completed. The contract was induced by fraud, and it was unreasonable to enforce the warranty exclusion under those circumstances.
This Court also focused on the fact that plaintiffs declined to have the vehicle inspected. Because the sellers represented that the vehicle had been properly repaired, the
buyers had no duty to investigate to determine whether that representation was true.
Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). Indeed, because the inadequately repaired frame had been covered, an inspection would not have disclosed the problem.
Andy Anderson, plaintiff's expert who was employed to repair the van after the second
accident, testified that he was not able to discover the problem until he disassembled the
vehicle. Mr. Anderson testified that he inspected the van and gave an estimate for repair
of the van following the second accident, but when he started performing the repairs he
discovered the previously hidden damage:
Q
Did you find that there were other damages other than
what was on that first estimate?
A
Absolutely.
Q
What other damage did you discover?
A
Once we started putting panels on it and everything,
we couldn't get nothing to fit. We couldn't figure out why.
So it was at that time that we elected to completely gut the
whole inside of the van. Took all the carpeting, headliner,
side panels, seats, everything.
Q
Why was that necessary?
A
Because at that point, we didn't know what was
wrong. Then we kept seeing these little buckles. So I says to

strip it. So the floor panel rather than being flat like this desk
looked like the ocean at high tide. And when we took the
front seats out of it, the floor panel underneath the front seats
were so buckled and so compressed, and this was not because
of this last accident, okay? Because it wasn't Q
Are you sure of that?
A

It was from the front compression, not the rear com-

pression. It appeared to me at that time that this car had bottomed out and then buckled everything back up, up and
backwards like this. There were shims under the front seat to
get the front seats to level, okay? . . .
(Deposition of Andy Anderson pp. 7-8 (R. 328), as attached as Exhibit C to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
400).)
This testimony describes an extremely invasive "inspection" which was necessary
before the defects could be observed. It confirms that the defects were hidden and known
only to defendants. If plaintiffs had hired a mechanic to inspect the van, the mechanic
would have found no problems unless the mechanic completely gutted the interior of the
van. Such an invasive inspection should not be required of a buyer, particularly where
the seller affirmatively represented that the repairs were properly performed. Summary
judgment on this issue was error.
Contrary to this Court's statement, the claim that the contract had been fraudulently induced was raised in plaintiffs' opposition to the first summary judgment motion.
(Plaintiffs Memorandum at p. 8 (disclaimer not valid because of "the aforementioned
misrepresentations and material omissions on the part of Clark")). Judge Brian erred in
granting summary judgment on the fraud issue.1 An exclusion of warranties is not en*It is important to remember that Judge Brian also ruled that there were disputed factual
issues regarding the express and implied warranty claims, and that those claims should go
to trial. It is inherently unfair to ignore that part of Judge Brian's ruling while enforcing
his dismissal of the fraud claims. If it was proper for Judge Iwasaki to reconsider any of

5

forceable if it is "unreasonable," Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(l). Such an exclusion is
not reasonable and is not enforceable if induced by fraud. "A contract limitation on damages or remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud." Ong Int'l
(USA). Inc. v, 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). The contract here was
induced by the misrepresentation that the vehicle had been properly repaired. Summary
judgment on this issue was error.
It is evident from the transcript of the hearing before Judge Iwasaki that he considered himself bound by Judge Brian's ruling on the fraud issue. (Tr. of hearing August 16,
1998, at p. 30.) This was error because Judge Iwasaki had full authority to reconsider
Judge Brian's prior ruling. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b); Ron Shepherd Ins.. Inc. v. Shields. 882
P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994) ("It is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment."); Interlake Distributors. Inc.
v. Old Mill Towne. 954 P.2d 1295,1299-1300 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Where one judge
replaced another on a case, the second judge had full authority to reconsider and change
any non-final decision of the prior judge). Judge Iwasaki erred in refusing to reconsider
the dismissal of the fraud claims. Judge Brian's dismissal of those fraud claims ignored
the requirement that all inferences be taken in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment.
Basic fairness demanded that Judge Iwasaki either reconsider all of Judge Brian's
order, or none of it. Judge Brian ruled that the express and implied warranty claims
should go to trial. Defendants' excuse for seeking reconsideration of that ruling was that
depositions had been taken which shed new light on the case. The depositions had, however, also shed new light on the fraud case by establishing that the defects in the van were

Judge Brian's ruling, it was proper to reconsider all of it. The deposition testimony of
Andy Anderson was obtained after Judge Brian's ruling and justified reconsidering the
dismissal of the fraud claims.

hidden and that defendants had limited the scope of the repairs. Judge Iwasaki was not
bound by Judge Brian's ruling on the fraud claims, and erred in so holding.

POINT IITHE CLAIMS FOR VIOLATION OF THE MOTORVEHICLE
STATUTES WERE SUPPORTED BY THERECORD; JUDGE BRIAN'S
DISMISSAL OF THOSECLAIMS WAS ERROR.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits summary judgment only
if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This Court misapprehended that the affidavits on file at the time of the first motion for summary judgment
raised factual issues concerning the claims for violation of the motion vehicle statutes.
Paragraphs 7 and 26 of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R. 95-112) gave notice
that plaintiffs raised claims under the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. In their memorandum
opposing summary judgment, plaintiffs argued several violations of the act. Plaintiffs
explained that the sale "was not negotiated or closed at K & K Sales['] business premises
and by a licensed motor vehicle salesman as required by the Utah Motor Vehicle A c t . . .
."2 (R. 220.) The statement of facts in the memorandum explained that Paul Clark placed
a newspaper advertisement for the vehicle, giving only his name and home telephone
number.3 (R. 216.) It was not until after the terms of the sale had been agreed that plain-

violates Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-210(1)(n) (prohibiting sale of dealer's vehicles from
home or other unlicensed locations).
3

Violates Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-210(1)(b) (prohibiting advertisements which do not
identify the dealer).

tiffs first learned that a dealer was involved.4 These factual assertions were supported by
the affidavits of plaintiffs as well as the affidavits of defendants.
Because defendants violated the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, plaintiffs were entitled
to recover a civil penalty of $1,000 or treble actual damages, whichever was greater, plus
their attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-702(4).
While plaintiffs' opposing memorandum unfortunately did not separately list each
violation of the Motor Vehicle Act along with the subsection violated,5 that failure did not
make summary judgment proper. "Where a party opposed to the motion [for summary
judgment] submits no documents in opposition, the moving party may be granted summary judgment only 'if appropriate,' that is, if he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Olwell v. Clark. 658 P.2d 585, 586 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has further stated:
Therefore, under Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P., summary
judgment can be granted only if the record shows that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment. Litigants must be able to present their
cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered
against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the

4

Violates Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-210(1)(m) (prohibiting sales by unlicensed salespersons).
5

Plaintiffs did provide this detail in Plaintiffs' Notice of Objections to Proposed Order on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 275-283), which was filed over a month
before Judge Brian entered the order granting summary judgment.

court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right
to recovery.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. Chartered, 6S1
P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (italics added).
The evidence before Judge Brian showed the defendants violated the Motor Vehicle Act. Although the arguments were not focused at first, detailed arguments explaining
the violations of the Act were submitted before entry of the order granting summary
judgment. The summary judgment was improper and should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
This Court's cursory affirmance of the summary dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint
failed to apprehend that the fraud claims were properly raised in response to the first motion for summary judgment. Although couched in terms of a defense to the express warranty, the claims were a valid defense to the purported disclaimer of the warranties. The
transaction was induced by the fraudulent representation that the vehicle had been adequately repaired. These disputed factual issues made summary judgment improper.
Summary judgment was also improper on the violations of the Motor Vehicle Act.
The facts in the record showed the violations. The issue was raised and fully briefed before the trial court entered its order. At the least, Judge Iwasaki should have reconsidered
the issue at the same time he reopened and reconsidered the balance of Judge Brian's
summary judgment ruling.
This Court should grant rehearing and hold that summary judgment was improper.
The case should be remanded for trial.
DATED this g ^ ^ f l a y of July, 1999.
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Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
Plaintiffs James K. and Rebecca R. Rawson appeal from both
Judge Brian's and Judge Iwasakifs grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants Kim Edward and Karen Jane Conover, K&K Sales,
Paul Clark, and Old Republic Surety Company. We affirm.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." S.W. Energy Corp. v. Continental
Ins. Co., 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 61, 63 (Utah 1999) (citing Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c)). "We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment for correctness, according no deference to the court's
legal conclusions, Thompson v. Jess, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 65
(Utah 1999), and "!accept the facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the losing party.f" Nyman v. McDonald, 966
P.2d 1210, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted)).
Plaintiffs argue that Judge Brian erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants on all of plaintiffs' claims
except breach of express and implied warranties under the Utah
Commercial Code. We disagree. Although plaintiffs alleged seven
causes of action in their amended complaint, they only addressed
the issues of express and implied warranties in their memorandum

in opposition to defendants1 motion for summary judgment. In
addition, the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs in support of
their memorandum failed to assert any facts to support their
claims under the Utah Consumer Protection Act, the Utah Motor
Vehicle Act, or their products liability claim. See Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule," an adverse party's response,
"by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial."). We therefore conclude Judge Brian properly granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants.
Plaintiffs also argue that Judge Iwasaki erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs1 claims of
breach of express and implied warranties. Again, we disagree.
Plaintiffs admitted they were aware the vehicle had been salvaged
and repaired. Also, Mr. Rawson stated he did not rely on any
oral representations regarding the condition of the vehicle.
Therefore, the written documents, clearly stating the vehicle was
being sold "AS IS" without warranty, represented the entire
agreement between the parties. See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d
143, 148 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). By signing the contract and
declining to have the vehicle inspected, plaintiffs waived all
express and implied warranties under the Utah Commercial Code.
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(3) (a) (1997) ("all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as i s / . . . which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion or warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty"); isL. § 70A-2-316 (3) (b) (1997) ("when the buyer . . .
has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him").
Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

U^Judith M. B i l l i n g s ,

Judg«
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